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lition bad standing to pursue a judicial
review action under the common law
or MESA. The court first examined
the circuit court's holding that there
could be no judicial review of the permits under section 9-263. Id. at 606,
612 A.2d at 246. The trial judge reasoned that the issuance of permits did
not qualify as an "order" under section
9-263. Id.at603,612A2dat244. The
court of appeals noted, however, that
the refuse disposal permit was issued
pursuant to a decision by the Department of the Environment. Id. at 607,
612A2dat246. Theydeterminedthat
this decision was synonymous with an
"order," and was subject to judicial
review under section 9-263 of the Environment Article. Id.
The court next turned to the issue of
whether the permits were "contested
cases," and therefore also subject to
judicial review under the APA. The
State Government Article, section 10201 (c), Maryland Code Annotated, defines a contested case as "a proceeding
. . . that is required by law to be
determined only after an opportunity
for an agency hearing." Id. The court
found that the State requires a hearing
prior to the approval of a construction
penn it. Id. at 609, 612 A.2d at 247
(citing Sugarloaf v. Waste Disposal,
323 Md. 641, 656-57, 594 A.2d 1115,
1122 ( 1991 Thus, the court held that
the hearings held prior to the issuance
ofthe permits fell within the definition
ofacontestedcaseundertheAPA Id.
The court recognized that although
the permits themselves were subject to
judicial review under both section 9263 and the APA, the Coalition had to
meet standing requirements in order to
challenge the issuance ofthe permits.
Id. at 611, 612 A.2dat248. Thecourt
stated that in order for an organization
to have standing, it must have a "property interest of its own. . . separate and
distinct from that ofits individual members." Id. at 612-13,612 A.2d at 249
(quoting Citizens Planning and Housing Ass 'n v. County Executive, 273
Md. 333, 345,329 A.2d 681, 687-88
(1974». The Coalition failed to show

».

tbat it possessed a separate and distinct
property interest. Id. at 614, 612 A2d
at 250. 10 addition, because it brought
an action to remedy a ''public wrong,"
the court found that the Coalition failed
to show it had suffered "damage from
such wrong differing in character and
kind from that suffered by the general
public." Id. at 612-13, 612 A2dat 249
(citing Rogers v. Maryland-National
Capital Park and Planning Comm 'n,
253 Md 687, 691,253 A2d 713, 715

(1969». The court ofappeals thus held
tbat the Coalition lacked standing under Maryland common law to bring an
action for judicial review. Id. at 614,
612 A2d at 250.
The court of appeals next determined whether the Coalition bad standingunderMESA lei. at617,612A2d
at 252. MESA changed the Maryland
common law requirements for standing in certain environmental proceedings. Section 1-503(a)(3) relaxed the
standing requirements for an organization regardless of whether or not it had
suffered a property damage which was
independent of its individual members. In addition, the organization did
not need to show that it suffered a harm
which differed from that ofthe general
public. Id. at615, 612 A2dat2S0-Sl.
The court noted that the relaxed
standing requirements of MESA applied specifically to actions for "mandamus or equitable relief ..• against
any officer or agency of the State ...
for failure . . . to perform a
nondiscretionary ministerial duty imposed upon them ... or for failure to
enforce an applicable environmental
quality standard." Id. at 615-16 (quoting MESA, Md. Nat. Res. Code Ann.
§ 1-503(b) (1989». The court also
determined that MESA did not grant
reliefto a party ifthe aggrieved activity
complied with a current, lawful permit
"issued by an agency of the United
States, [or] the State." Id. at 617, 612
A.2d at 251. Because this case involvedjudicial review of the issuance
of two pennits which did not fall
within the express provisions ofMESA,
the Coalition was not granted stand-

ing. The court held that MESA did not
broaden standing requirements generally, but'only relaxed standing requirements for specific provisions. Id. at
618, 612 A.2d at 252. The court emphasized that MESA does not "grant
organizations . . . standing to participate in judicial review of an administrative decision." Id. at 622, 612 A.2d
at 254.
Medical Waste Associates is significant because the Court of Appeals
ofMaryland interpretedMESAstrictly.
The court reviewed the legislative history of MESA, and held that the intent
of the General Assembly was to relax
the standing requirements only forspecific actions. In all other cases, an
organization must invoke standing
under either Maryland common law or
another statute. This decision may
have a serious impact on Maryland
environmental issues. If an environmental organization does not meet the
AP A requirements for standing, and
does not fall within the narrow limits
of MESA, the group may not bring an
action for judicial review of permits
issued by the Department of the Environment.
- Bonnie S. Laakso
Reddick v. Stllte: SENTENCING

JUDGE'S OFFER TO SUSPEND
FIVE YEARS IMPRISONMENT
UPON PAYMENT OF RESTITUTION TO VICTIM'S FAMILY
VIOLATED INDIGENT
DEFENDANT'S EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS.
In Reddick v. State, 327 Md. 270,
608 A.2d 1246 (1992), the Court of
Appeals of Maryland held that a sentencingjudge's offerto suspend part of
an indigent defendant's sentence upon
payment of the victim's medical and
funeral expenses was illegal because it
violated the defendant's rights to equal
protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. The court's holding effectively limits the power of judges to
encourage payment ofrestitution when
imposing criminal sentences.
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A jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City convicted Raymond
Frances Reddick ("Reddick") and
Harvey Lee Southall of second degree
murder and the unlawful use ofa handgun. Although the sentencing guidelines suggested a twenty-five year sentence, Judge Hammerman imposed a
thirty year sentence for the second degree murder conviction and ten years
for the handgun violation, to be served
concurrently. The Judge believed that
the sentence was justified in light of
the degree ofviolence ofthe crime and
the devastating impact the defendants'
actions had on the victim's family. In
addition, Judge Hammerman was concerned about the fmancial burden the
defendants' actions had placed upon
the victim's family. Medical and funeral expenses amounted to $6,000. In
light of this burden, the Judge offered
each defendant the opportunity to reduce his sentence to twenty-five years
upon payment of $3,000 individually
to the victim's mother by February 2,
1991.
On appeal to the Court of Special
Appeals ofMaryland, both defendants'
convictions were affirmed in an unreported opinion. The Court of Appeals
of Maryland granted Reddick's petition for certiorari. Reddick contended
that because he is indigent, the offer to
reduce his sentence upon making a
contribution toward the expenses
placed upon the family of the victim
was unconstitutional. He asserted that
this offer constituted an unlawful distinction among sentences based on a
defendant's wealth or poverty, and
therefore violated the Equal Protection
Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and
Article 24 ofthe Maryland Declaration
of Rights. To further illustrate his
position, Reddick argued that it was
''unconstitutional to incarcerate an indigent defendant fora term longer than
that imposed on a similarly situated
nonindigent defendant who would be
able to make the requisite monetary
payment." Reddick, 327 Md., at 272,
608 A.2d at 1248. Accordingly,

Reddick requested that the court vacate his entire sentence because of the
unconstitutional conditional offer to
suspend five years of his sentence ifhe
paid the victim's family $3,000.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland
rejected the State's characterization of
the sentence as an unconditional thirty
year term containing a provision of
certain conduct, compliance with which
the defendant would encourage the trial
judge to modify the sentence. Id. at
273,608 A.2d at 1248. The court also
refused to accept the State's alternative
argument that the trial judge should
simply strike the illegal language containing the offer and allow the thirty
year sentence to stand because pennitting suspension of five years of the
sentence conditioned upon payment of
the victim's medical and funeral expenses was illegal and, thus, null and
void. Id.
Although the court ofappeals agreed
with Reddick's assertion that the offer
constituted a violation ofhis rights, the
court refused to vacate his entire sentence. Id. at 274, 608 A.2d at 1248.
Instead, the court simply struck the
illegal portion ofthe sentence and remanded the case to the Circuit Court
for Baltimore City with instructions to
resentence Reddickto a tenn oftwentyfive years. Id. In holding that Judge
Hammerman's offer to suspend part of
the sentence in return for contribution
to the victim's family's expenses was
unconstitutional, the court stated that
where a court has "detennined that a
fine or restitution is an appropriate
sentence, a court cannot then imprison
a defendant solely because of his inability to pay it." Reddick, 327 Md. at
273-74, 608 A.2d at 1248 (citing
Beardenv. Georgia,461 U.S. 660,665
(1983». Applying this principle of
equal protection to the present case, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland characterized Judge Hammerman's offer as a
chance to "buy" a suspended sentence.
Reddick v. State, 327 Md. at 273, 608
A.2d at 1248. The court concluded
that equal protection required that the
unconstitutional portion be stricken

from the sentence; otherwise, it would
imprison Reddick for a longer term
thana similarly situated defendant with
the financial capability to make the
payment. Id. at 274, 608 A.2dat 1248.
The court's holding effectively restricts the ability of the sentencing
judge to allow an indigent defendant
the opportunity to pay restitution for
his victim's expenses in order to reduce the term of incarceration. Where
the defendant's actions place heavy
financial burdens on a victim or his
family, the court has an interest in
seeing that the defendant take as much
responsibility as possible for those expenses. However, an offer ofa reduced
sentence in exchange for contribution
towards a victim's family's financial
burden will run afoul of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment where the judge is faced
with an indigent defendant. Thus,
despite a court's concern over expenses
imposed upon a victim's family, the
court cannot offer a defendant the opportunity to pay restitution to his victims at the expense of the defendant's
constitutional rights.
- Paula L. Davis

Two Pesos, Inc. v. TileD Cabana, Inc.:
PROTECTION OF INHERENTLY
DISTINCTIVE TRADE DRESS
UNDER LANHAM ACT DOES
NOT REQUIRE PROOF OF SECONDARY MEANING.
In Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana,
Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992), the United
States Supreme Court allowed protection of a restaurant's inherently distinctive trade dress under section 43(a)
of the Trademark: Act of 1946, 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982) (''Lanham
Act"), which provides protection to
businesses that are harmed by other
businesses using false representation
or description in connection with any
goods or services. Atfrrming the decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court rejected the assertion that secondary
meaning ofthe trade dress was a requisite element of its protection under the

30 The Law For u m 123.2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

